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RILEY V. NORTHERN COMMERCIAL:
COMMERCIAL RATIONALE TRIUMPHS OVER
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Riley v. Northern Commercial Co., I the Alaska Supreme
Court interpreted a promissory note providing for "interest after ma-
turity at the highest lawful contract rate.' 2 The note did not specify
an actual interest rate, but the court found that the parties had en-
tered into an express interest rate agreement. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court refused to apply the legal rate of interest 3 and
upheld the superior court's award of prejudgment interest at the
highest rate sanctioned by Alaska law under the variable interest
rate formula.4 Throughout this note, as well as in the court's opinion,
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. 648 P.2d 961 (Alaska 1982).
2. Id at 966.
3. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(a) (1980) ("The rate of interest in the state is 10.5
percent a year and no more on money after it is due except as provided in (b) of this
section.").
As the court noted: "At the time the contract was executed, as well as when the
debt matured, [ALASKA STAT. §] 45.45.010(a) set the legal rate of interest at 6%. An
amendment to [ALASKA STAT. §] 45.45.010(a), effective September 12, 1976, raised
the legal rate of interest to 8%. Ch. 159, § 1, SLA 1976." Riley, 648 P.2d at 966 n.14.
The court also correctly pointed out that under Alaska law "[a]mendments to the
legal rate of interest after the action accrued, but before judgment, govern from the
date they become effective. City of Juneau v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d
957, 959 (Alaska 1979) (per curiam); Rachlin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc., 33 A.D.[2d]
370, 375, 308 N.Y.S.2d 153, 158 (1970)." Riley, 648 P.2d at 966 n.14.
4. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (1980) (amended 1981) now provides:
No interest may be charged by express agreement of the parties in a con-
tract or loan commitment dated after June 4, 1976 which is more than five
percentage points above the annual rate charged member banks for ad-
vances by the 12th Federal Reserve District that prevailed on the 25th day
of the month preceding the commencement of the calendar quarter during
which the contract or loan commitment is made. A contract or loan com-
mitment in which the principal amount exceeds $100,000 is exempt from
the limitation of this subsection.
At the time the contract was executed ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(a) stated, in perti-
nent part: "The [legal] rate of interest in the state is six percent a year and no more
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legal rate refers to that rate of interest provided by law to accrue on
any obligation not specifying an interest rate; the variable rate is a
legislatively sanctioned level of interest, higher than the legal rate,
available to parties who agree expressly in their obligations that a
rate higher than the legal rate will apply. The variable rate sets the
uppermost level for interest; any level of interest higher than the va-
riable rate will be deemed usurious. The court considered it unper-
suasive that the parties had executed their note in 1975 and the
legislature had expressly provided that the amended variable interest
formula, which raised the allowable interest ceiling, was to apply
only to contracts made after June 4, 1976. 5
II. FACTS
On December 12, 1975, John Riley executed a promissory note
for $51,209.20 in favor of Northern Commercial. The note was
given to liquidate his account for supplies and services previously
rendered by Northern Commercial. Riley defaulted on the note af-
ter making one payment. On November 3, 1978, Northern Com-
mercial filed suit against Riley to collect on the unpaid promissory
note. Riley denied owing the full indebtedness and filed a counter-
claim for recovery of amounts allegedly due him in an unrelated
transaction. He failed, however, to timely respond to requests for
admission and the superior court granted Northern Commercial
summary judgment on both the promissory note and the contractual
counterclaim. On appeal, the supreme court sustained the summary
judgment rulings and also upheld the superior court's award of pre-
judgment interest at the highest rate obtainable under Alaska's
amended variable interest rate formula.
III. APPLICABLE INTEREST RATE PROVISION
Justice Compton, writing for the majority, began his discussion
of the prejudgment interest award by observing that contracts not
containing express interest rate agreements carry prejudgment inter-
est at the legal rate (which at the time was six percent). Although
parties may be bound by the legal rate of interest either by incorpo-
rating it or by leaving an interest rate out of their contract alto-
gether,6 Justice Compton noted that those parties not wishing to be
on ... money due or to become due when there is a contract to pay interest and no
rate is specified."
5. 648 P.2d at 968.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 45.03.122(d) (1980) provides that unless an instrument
states otherwise, interest on commercial paper runs at the rate provided by law for a
judgment. See id § 45.45.010(a). See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest & Usury
§ 68 (1969).
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so bound may agree on the applicable rate of interest as long as such
a rate does not exceed the variable interest rate formula.7
The court found that Riley and Northern Commercial entered
into an express interest agreement even though the promissory note
did not state a particular rate of interest or refer specifically to any
statutory interest rate provision. As a logical matter, the court stated
that the term "highest lawful rate" was not equivalent to "legal inter-
est" because the former "'means any rate of interest up to that fixed
by statute as the maximum rate at which interest can be contracted
for.' "8 Since the legal interest rate was not the highest rate obtain-
able under the Alaska statutory interest scheme, the court concluded
that the legal interest rate did not apply but the variable interest rate
formula did. The court reached this conclusion under the appropri-
ate standard of review, treating the contractual provision as a matter
of law since neither party alleged the surrounding circumstances to
be in dispute.9 One wonders, though, whether the contractual inter-
pretation is as simple as the court's logic indicates.
As the court later observed: "This is not a case where the par-
ties attempted to negotiate a cost of credit."10 The court's assump-
tion that the parties, who were not professional lenders, were
familiar with the statutory interest scheme - especially the variable
interest rate formula - seems unwarranted and unsubstantiated.
Indeed, the opposite seems far more plausible; that is, it is probable
that the parties were not aware of the variable provisions or that
those provisions might be changed in such a way as to affect their
contract. By contrast, an assumption that the parties were aware of
the legal interest rate provisions seems more likely. Thus, the court's
interpretation is perhaps not as neat as first impression indicates. In-
deed, when confronted with the same question, a Massachusetts
court found that "highest lawful rate" meant interest was due at the
legal rate."
Even if one does not fault the court's presumption that the par-
ties had a detailed knowledge of the statutory interest scheme,' 2 the
7. 648 P.2d at 966-67.
8. Id at 967 (quoting 45 Am. JUR. 2D Interest & Usury § 2, at 16-17 (1969)).
9. 648 P.2d at 967; see also Wessells v. State, 562 P.2d 1042, 1046 n.9 (Alaska
1977); Day v. A & G Constr. Co., 528 P.2d 440, 443 (Alaska 1974).
10. 648 P.2d at 968.
11. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingle, 347 Mass. 119, 124, 196 N.E.2d 847,
851 (1964) (interest rate applicable to promissory note after maturity, which pro-
vided for interest after maturity at highest lawful rate, was that provided by statute
in absence of any other agreement for interest rate).
12. See 648 P.2d at 967 (" 'The purpose of contract interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate the reasonable expectations of the parties.' ") (citing Wright v.
Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 497 (Alaska 1979); Stordahl v. Government Employees
1984]
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rationale behind its holding is still questionable. The court justified
its decision with a non sequitur by explaining that its holding was
required in an era of interest rate instability, otherwise the ability of
commercial parties to allocate the risk of nonperformance would be
unduly impaired. 13 But the allocation of commercial risk was only
tangentially involved in the question before the court. The court was
required to interpret a contract provision which already allocated the
risk of nonperformance, since Riley was required to pay the highest
lawful contract rate after maturity. 14 If the court had decided that
the parties had not reached an express interest agreement because of
ambiguous language and had applied the legal rate instead of the
variable formula, it would not have disturbed other commercial par-
ties who provided for specific interest rates in their contracts. The
only parties who would be affected by a decision that the clause was
ambiguous are those who have written similarly ambiguous clauses;
those who write clear interest clauses would be unaffected by this
case. Taken at face value, the court's opinion is tantamount to stat-
ing that in any case involving a vague interest clause the creditor
must receive the highest interest possible under any method of inter-
pretation or the commercial process will be impaired. Potential liti-
gants would be better served if the court had handled the matter by
construing the particular contract clause rather than by attempting to
universalize, under an untenable rationale, discrete litigation
problems. If the court meant what it said, it is easy to foresee lenders
writing clauses with a studied ambiguity hoping to achieve higher
interest rates should the legislature improve upon the present statu-
tory scheme.' 5 The court's seeming encouragement of such loose
language will be much more of an undue burden on commercial
transactions than is merited by the interest clause at stake in Riley.
The court concluded that the interest rate provision in the
promissory note was unambiguous. This conclusion seems ludi-
crous. Indeed, if the contractual provision was so clear one wonders
why it required such extensive litigation. Assuming that there was
ambiguity, the court should have applied the normal rule of contrac-
Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 65 (Alaska 1977); Day v. A & G Constr. Co., 528 P.2d 440, 445
(Alaska 1974)).
13. 648 P.2d at 967.
14. Id at 966.
15. This situation recalls the practice of parties' attempts to structure their se-
cured transactions under the guise of leases. See cases cited in J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE
§ 22-3, at 880-83 (2d ed. 1980). It is also reminiscent of the common practice of
structuring a mortgage as an absolute conveyance to allow the lender to avoid ex-
pensive and time-consuming foreclosure proceedings. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON
& D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.4 (1979).
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tual interpretation, that any ambiguity is construed against the
draftsman. 16 Had the court applied this rule, Riley would have paid
less interest.
IV. RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF THE VARIABLE FORMULA
After deciding that the variable interest formula applied to the
note, the court had to wrestle with a more problematic question.
The legislative amendment which raised the interest rate ceiling
stated that the higher rates were to be applied only to contracts made
after June 4, 1976. The amendment on its face was intended to oper-
ate only prospectively, not retroactively. Ignoring the statutory lan-
guage, the court circumvented the express legislative intent in a neat
end run. The majority began by deciding that the parties probably
intended to be bound in their contract by whatever rate changes the
legislature enacted. 17 The court supported this interpretation by
finding that the parties undoubtedly intended the interest provision
to operate as an indemnification for Riley's failure to perform.' 8
With relish, the court adopted the argument that Riley could have
avoided paying any interest had he performed.' 9 It is submitted that
the court answered a needless question about the parties' intention,
albeit probably correctly. Evidently not entirely satisfied with its
reading of the parties' intention, the court returned to its commercial
rationale by saying that it would be "anomalous to adopt a rule
which, due to rising interest rates, rewards Riley for failing to per-
form, and, more generally, creates an incentive for debtors to
default." 20
The court stated that the language of the statute limiting the
higher interest formula to contracts signed after June 4, 1976 did not
apply in this case because it did not prevent parties from agreeing to
be bound by a higher interest rate should the legislature allow it. In
reasoning which virtually ignored the legislative language, the court
argued that the legislature meant only to prohibit the subsequent
validation of previously usurious interest rate provisions. Having set
up this straw man, the court knocked it down by observing that the
contract in question was not usurious since it did not specify any
interest rate at all. Therefore, the statutory limitation did not apply
and Riley was required to pay the higher rate even though his con-
16. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559 (1960); 4 S. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 621 (3d ed. 1961).
17. 648 P.2d at 968.
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id
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tract was written six months before the legislature adjusted the rate
upward.
While the court cited the black letter rule that "a statutory
amendment of the legal interest rate will not be applied retroactively
if it alters the rights and duties under an existing contract," 21 it never
applied this rule in the case at bar. Indeed, if the parties had an
express interest agreement in the court's eyes on December 12, 1975,
which vested at the highest rate then available, was not their contract
finalized at that point? The court seemingly answered no; the parties
agreed to be bound by a higher rate if the legislature saw fit to raise
the interest ceiling. If the legislature had lowered the interest ceiling,
would the court then have reduced the interest rate for which Riley
would be responsible? It seems obvious that the answer would be
no. The court could not lower the interest rate because it would im-
pair the rights of Northern Commercial under the contract. At issue
is the point at which the contract's interest agreement was finalized
- when the contract was signed, or when a judgment was issued.
The lender cannot have it both ways. If the rates can be applied
retroactively on the way up, they should be applied retroactively on
the way down. Yet, the overwhelming weight of authority states that
a legislative enactment lowering interest rates can have no such ef-
fect because it would disturb vested contract rights. 22
But the most important question raised by the court's discussion
of interest rates was never asked, let alone answered. Even Justice
Rabinowitz - who in his dissent agreed with the majority's finding
of an express interest agreement and the application of the variable
interest rate formula, but parted company over its retroactive appli-
cation 23 - failed to fully articulate the question, although he did
reach the correct conclusion. The important question is: even if the
parties saw fit to provide for a higher interest rate should the legisla-
ture allow it, did the legislature in fact allow it?
The Michigan Court of Appeals confronted this question in
Campbell v. Gawart. 24 The question before the Campbell court con-
cerned a land contract which provided for a maximum interest rate.
The contract also included a clause allowing a higher interest rate if
the legislature raised the rate ceiling. The court said that such an
interest agreement may be valid, but its effect was to be controlled by
the way in which the legislature changed the law.25
21. Id (citing AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 10, at 23-25 (1969); Annot., 4
A.L.R. 2D 932 (1949).
22. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.2D 932, 935-39 (1949).
23. 648 P.2d at 970 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part).
24. 46 Mich. App. 529, 208 N.W.2d 607 (1973).
25. Id at 531-32, 208 N.W.2d at 609.
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If the Legislature clearly manifests an intent that only contracts
executed after a certain date may bear a higher interest rate, a
contractual provision to the contrary is of no force or effect ....
What that future law will be is the prerogative of the Legislature. If
the Legislature changes the law in a way that is wholly prospective
the old maximum rate applies and this is not an impairment of
contract. 2
6
Accordingly, clear language calling for only prospective application
required the court to apply the variable interest rate in effect at the
time the parties signed their contract.
A long line of Alaska cases support the impropriety of awarding
prejudgment interest for the full period at the higher rate permitted
by a statutory amendment after the date of an accident but prior to
the judgment. The supreme court has frequently held that the
proper course is to award the prior rate of interest until the date of
the amendment, then to award the higher rate for the period until
judgment.2 7 Thus, it seems the court adopted the logic it first es-
poused in State v. Phillis,28 and later articulated in City of Juneau v.
Commercial Union Insurance Co., 29 that "prejudgment interest is a
substantive right of an injured party, to allow that party to recover
for economic loss occasioned by his inability to use the award of
damages between the injury and judgment. '30
Apparently, the Riley court became tangled in a commercial ra-
tionale before it answered the question of what was permitted by the
legislative language. As a result, the court incorporated the compen-
satory purpose rationale from the Phillis and Juneau cases, which
discussed the amendment of the legal prejudgment interest statute,
into the Riley decision. "We conclude that at least where the interest
provision is intended to establish compensatory damagesfor the deten-
tion of money, the statutory language does not preclude parties to a
contract from agreeing to be bound by future modifications in the
statutory formula."' 31 In reaching this conclusion the court, in its
zeal to compensate Northern Commercial for the use of the money
to which the court believed it was entitled, ignored the statutory
mandate that the new interest rate not apply retroactively.
By focusing on the compensation the court felt was due to com-
mercial parties, rather than on the legislature's prospective language,
the court retroactively applied a statute which clearly was intended
26. Id at 532, 208 N.W.2d at 609 (emphasis added).
27. Drickersen v. Drickersen, 604 P.2d 1082, 1087 (Alaska 1979); City of Juneau
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957, 958 (Alaska 1979) (per curiam).
28. 470 P.2d 266, 273 n.27 (Alaska 1970).
29. 598 P.2d 957 (Alaska 1979).
30. Id at 959.
31. 648 P.2d at 968 (emphasis added).
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to operate only prospectively. In so doing, the court violated both
the positive command of the legislature that "[n]o statute is retro-
spective unless expressly declared therein," 32 and its own established
rule of construction that "'in the absence of a clear expression to the
contrary a law is presumed to operate prospectively only.' -33
V. CONCLUSION
Probably uppermost in the justices' minds was a fear that
'[failure to award prejudgment interest creates a substantial
financial incentive for defendants to litigate even where liabilty is so
clear and the jury award so predictable that they should settle.' -34 If
so, such a concern was misplaced for three reasons. First, Northern
Commercial was going to be awarded interest; the only question was
how much. Second, the interest rate differential in the instant case
was small; it was only one percentage point (as Justice Rabinowitz
pointed out).35 Third, the court should not penalize one party by
engaging in a plausible, yet less than probable, construction of his
contractual promise in order to achieve what the court believes to be
a socially desirable policy. Controverting an express legislative pol-
icy that a statute should operate only prospectively is not a judicial
task. The interests of society and litigants are better served by a less
activist reading of otherwise clear statutory language.
Accordingly, prejudgment interest should have been assessed at
the rate in force at the time Riley gave his note to Northern Com-
mercial. As a matter of contractual interpretation, interest should
have been assessed at the legal rate because of the black letter propo-
sition that ambiguous language is construed against the draftsman.
It is also submitted that an application of the legal interest rate
would be more in keeping with the probable expectations of the
parties.
C. Mark Baker
32. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.090 (1982).
33. City of Juneau v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 957, 959 (Alaska
1979) (per curiam) (quoting Hill v. Moe, 367 P.2d 739, 742 (Alaska 1961)).
34. Drickersen v. Drickersen, 604 P.2d 1082, 1087 n.8 (Alaska 1979) (quoting
State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 274 (Alaska 1970)).
35. 648 P.2d at 970 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part).
[Vol. 1:109
